After 6 Appellate Division leave grants from the first few months of the 2017-18 term, November and December only saw the Appellate Division finding three new cases to send to the Court of Appeals, two from the First Department and one from the Second Department. That brings the total Appellate Division leave grants to 9, with 4 coming from the First Department, 3 from the Second Department, and 2 from the Fourth Department.
Here’s a quick look at the new cases for the Court of Appeals to decide.
November Appellate Division Leave Grants
Mery v Eginger, 149 AD3d 827 (2d Dept 2017)
Question presented: In a case where the plaintiff was struck in the eye by piece of wire ejected from lawn mower, whether the property owner was vicariously liable for negligence on part of independent contractor who was mowing the property owner’s lawn, and whether lawn mowing is an inherently dangerous activity.
Supreme Court, Dutchess County, granted the motion of defendant Society of Friends Church for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed.
December Appellate Division Leave Grants
Matter of Lacee L. (Stephanie L.), 153 AD3d 1151 (1st Dept 2017)
Question presented: Whether the Americans With Disabilities Act applies in a Family Court article 10 proceeding in evaluating whether agency made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency goal of returning the subject child to the parent, who suffers from a cognitive disability.
Family Court, Bronx County, determined that the petitioner agency made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency goal of returning the subject child to respondent mother during the nine-month period following the child’s removal. The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed.
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation (South v Chevron), 153 AD3d 461 (1st Dept 2017)
Question presented: In a case where the plaintiff, who was exposed to asbestos while serving as merchant mariner, executed a release before receiving a mesothelioma diagnosis, whether a release executed by the plaintiff in a 1997 Jones Act (46 USC § 30104 et seq.) action was enforceable in subsequent Jones Act and negligence action brought by the plaintiff and his wife derivatively against defendant manufacturer of asbestos.
Supreme Court, New York County, denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The Appellate Division, First Department affirmed.